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This article will analyse a shift in the tax administration’s 
approach towards taxpayers, based more on cooperation 
than repression. This new approach, advocated by the 
OECD, is present in a growing number of countries and 
serves as an additional tool for ensuring timely tax collec-
tion. Croatia has recently adopted legislation regarding 
cooperative compliance, which makes the topic a highly 
interesting one. In a comparative analysis of selected coun-
tries the following issues will be discussed: the reasons for 
such a change in attitude, the way terminology is used by 
the leading organisations in the field, the way the change in 
attitude manifests itself through compliance programmes, 
the selection criteria for participating in the programmes, 
the main principles and objectives of the procedure, the 
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way the procedure is structured, and the results of coop-
erative compliance programmes. Finally, some concluding 
remarks will be given.
Keywords: enhanced relationship, cooperative compliance, 
tax evasion and avoidance, Croatian tax administration
1. Introduction
Large businesses and multinational enterprises operate on a global scale. 
Differences in national legislative systems, their approaches to supervision, 
and enforcement methods can cause numerous difficulties in the way they 
do business. Indeed, one can say that tax authorities may have a tendency 
to consider the taxpayer’s activities as solely or predominantly tax-motivat-
ed, which is not always the case. This is the reason why the OECD favours 
an “enhanced relationship” or rather “cooperative compliance” as an ap-
proach that is being increasingly adopted at an international level (OECD, 
2008). The work of the European Union also follows this global trend and 
has been presented in a report entitled “Compliance Risk Management 
Guide for Tax Administrations” (European Commission, 2010).
Within the EU some forms of programmes based on cooperative com-
pliance have been introduced in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and 
the UK (Stevens et al. 2012, p.109). In Southeast Europe it is Slovenia 
and FYR Macedonia that have introduced a programme of horizontal 
monitoring (Verbič et al., 2014, p. 65).
Modifications made to the Croatian Law on Tax Administration (NN 
148/13, 141/14, Art. 83a) introduced a provision entitled “Granting of 
a special status to taxpayers in order to enhance voluntary tax compli-
ance” (Dodjeljivanje posebnog statusa poreznom obvezniku u svrhu promicanja 
dobrovoljnog ispunjenja poreznih obveza). According to this provision tax 
authorities are allowed to grant a special status to the taxpayer within 
the scope of the voluntary tax compliance programme. The Ministry of 
Finance has recently issued a rulebook which further details the condi-
tions in which this status can be granted to or revoked from a particular 
taxpayer.1
1 Rulebook on the granting and withdrawing of the special status of the taxpayer in 
order to encourage voluntary tax compliance (OG 67/15).
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In this article we will thus analyse the programmes of cooperation by 
means of which the tax administration cooperates with the taxpayers – 
a novelty in the Croatian tax system – by comparing them to the pro-
grammes introduced in the Netherlands, Slovenia, and France. The Neth-
erlands was chosen because its model served as a basis for the Croatian 
(and Slovenian model), Slovenia was chosen as a neighbouring country 
whose experience can be used as a good reference point in comparison 
with the Croatian tax administration, and finally, France was chosen as a 
country that has a long tradition of taxation and serves as a comparative 
model to the Dutch one.
2. When Repression is no Longer Sufficient
Due to the intense liberalisation of capital movements in the 1980s and 
1990s, tax evasion and tax avoidance became an important problem for 
countries all over the world. Member States of the EU (MS) are especially 
affected by this, due to the diversity of their respective legal systems. The 
situation in which economic operators profit from the elimination of tax 
barriers, while national tax authorities remain confined to their jurisdic-
tions, calls for coordinated action by the MS in order to effectively tackle 
tax evasion and tax avoidance. No country can deal with this problem 
alone. Although the issue of tax evasion and tax avoidance is not a recent 
one, the MS became more conscious of the sheer magnitude of the prob-
lem during the latest economic crisis. In their final communiqué issued 
on the occasion of the Moscow 2013 G20 Summit, the finance ministers, 
led by those of the UK, France, and Germany (George Osborne, Pierre 
Moscovici, and Wolfgang Schäuble respectively), stated: “We are deter-
mined to develop measures to address base erosion and profit shifting, 
take necessary collective actions and look forward to the comprehensive 
action plan the OECD will present to us in July.” This call to action is just 
a drop in an ocean of similar documents, stressing the importance for the 
MS to rapidly address this growing problem. 
Although there are numerous definitions of tax evasion and tax avoidance, 
for the purposes of this article we shall refer to tax evasion as an: “inher-
ently illegal activity that is punishable by criminal sanctions. It is an action 
by a taxpayer which entails breaking the law and which moreover can be 
shown to have been taken with the intention of escaping payment of tax. 
The illegality arises through the failure to declare properly the appropriate 
amount of assessable income derived in an otherwise legal transaction.” 
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(Merks, 2006, p. 272) Tax avoidance, on the other hand, is a notion that 
is far more difficult to grasp. The limits between what is considered to be 
acceptable tax planning and unacceptable tax avoidance are sometimes 
very hard to determine. 
The OECD Report on International Tax Avoidance and Evasion states 
that: “It should be added that successful tax reduction is neither a suffi-
cient nor a necessary test of tax avoidance. It is not sufficient because this 
would cover acceptable tax planning and it is not necessary because an 
avoidance scheme designed to reduce tax may not succeed.” On the other 
hand, the report considers (based on a case) that: “This (the case) would 
constitute a tax avoidance arrangement because: a) it offends the spirit 
of the law which allows relief on genuine interest; b) the main benefit 
from the transaction is the obtaining of a tax benefit not the obtaining of 
a loan; c) the whole scheme is artificial; it is not carried out in a normal 
commercial manner” (OECD, 1987, p.12). Thus, one can conclude that 
the necessary elements for an action to be considered tax avoidance are 
not that it be illegal, but rather it must offend the spirit of the law for the 
purpose of obtaining a tax benefit and must be carried out in an artificial 
and not a commercial manner.
Even though the tax gap as a result of tax avoidance is very hard to meas-
ure, even for the most developed countries, all key players agree that it is 
a problem that needs to be settled urgently and in a comprehensive man-
ner. In this sense, the OECD as the major driving force besides the EU, 
in its report on base erosion and profit shifting states that: “… a holistic 
approach is necessary to properly address the issue of BEPS. Government 
actions should be comprehensive and deal with all the different aspects of 
the issue.” (OECD, 2013a, p. 7) The report proceeds to suggest a series 
of measures designed to tackle the issue, destined to solidify tax systems 
across the world.
However, having a solid tax system is not in itself sufficient to tackle tax 
evasion and tax avoidance, and to ensure the recovery of the necessary 
income from taxes. What is also required is a good system of procedural 
rules which will ensure that tax rules are indeed respected. 
Tax evasion and tax avoidance cannot be studied separately from the 
notion of tax compliance (civisme fiscal). Bouvier distinguishes two con-
cepts of tax compliance, both in its initial, classical form, as well as in its 
contemporary form. The classical form of tax compliance means that the 
taxpayers need to give their approval of the newly introduced taxes in the 
form of parliamentary consent, according to which tax laws are voted in 
by their parliamentary representatives (Bouvier, 2012, p. 25).
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In Croatia, this rule translates into the form of the constitutional principle 
of legality by which the tax administration is bound in their actions. In this 
sense, Art. 5 of the Constitution stipulates that each law needs to con-
form to the Constitution and that every other legal act needs to conform 
to the law and the Constitution. Art. 19 of the Constitution, on the other 
hand, stipulates that each individual administrative act needs to be found-
ed in the law and that judicial control of the act needs to be guaranteed.
Nowadays the notion of tax compliance has become even more important 
because of the changes that the tax systems underwent during the 20th 
century. Previously, real estate taxes as well as income taxes were assessed 
on the basis of external, visible indicators which were easily perceivable. 
The tax assessor walked down the street and examined the properties. 
It was therefore very easy to assess tax obligation. Without any kind of 
contract and on the sole basis of legal presumptions attached to external 
signs, the tax agent was able to objectively and automatically determine 
the amount of tax that was due. 
However, analytical taxes were, progressively and almost entirely, re-
placed by synthetic ones, which in return had great repercussions on the 
nature and manner of tax assessment. In order to correctly assess taxes, it 
is important for the tax assessor to be familiar with the entire financial sit-
uation of the taxpayer. Who else but the taxpayer himself is better placed 
to know his financial situation? It is only logical that the direct method, 
based on the taxpayer declaring his own taxes, came to know such a surge 
in importance during the 20th century. Associating the taxpayer and the 
tax administration in the determination of the tax base, the direct method 
implies not only faith of the tax administration in the accuracy of the tax 
form but also sincerity on the part of the taxpayer.
An appropriate system of verification had to be put into place in order 
to minimise the risk of fraud. With contacts between the tax administra-
tion and the taxpayers becoming ever more frequent, it became rather 
exceptional that a tax assessment procedure should happen without the 
intervention of the tax administration. This is how the tax audit procedure 
became one of the essential elements of tax policy.
Primarily, it has to guarantee tax compliance, in other words, a respect 
for and a sound application of the tax laws. The purpose of a tax audit 
procedure is to rectify all the intentional or unintentional errors in a tax 
return form by performing an in-depth analysis of the claims stated in it. 
Secondly, a tax audit procedure needs to ensure equality amongst tax-
payers. This function is essential to maintain the acceptance of taxes by 
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the taxpayers, who need to contribute to public expenses in proportion 
to their revenues. At a time when the amount of public debt is attaining 
historic values, tax audit procedures represent a major factor in ensuring 
that equality among citizens is respected. Finally, tax audits guarantee the 
recovery of taxes, one of the main sources of public revenues.
The intrusive and repressive character of a tax audit can create in the 
taxpayer a feeling of frustration, obliging him to divulge modes of oper-
ation, professional secrets, or details of the directors’ private lives. This 
is why the intrusive character of a tax audit requires the procedure to 
be surrounded by special guarantees intended to assure its impartiality, 
objectivity, neutrality, and transparency. Still the feeling of repression ex-
perienced by the taxpayer can result in resistance to tax audits, which can 
in turn contribute to tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
That said, tax administrations do not have sufficient personnel or resourc-
es at their disposal to control all taxpayers. Bearing in mind the ever-grow-
ing budgetary restrictions, the number of taxpayers can only diminish in 
the following years. Even if the tendency were reversed, the number of tax 
auditors could never be parallel to the number of taxpayers. Therefore, 
countries are obliged to find a new, more contemporary way to encourage 
tax compliance.
A new approach of tax authorities towards the taxpayers, based on the no-
tion of tax compliance, has entirely modified their relationship. This trend 
began in many European and non-European countries in the 70s and the 
80s, which was a time of reform of certain tax law instruments as well as a 
time of change in the attitude towards taxation, which left a mark on the 
behaviour of tax authorities (Rogić-Lugarić & Čičin-Šain, 2014, p. 347).
The tendency of improving the relationship between the tax administra-
tion and the taxpayers is certainly present in France. Besides the initial 
political legitimacy of taxation, which manifests itself in the form of parlia-
mentary consent when tax laws are voted in, there is a form of managerial 
legitimacy, based on the idea that the attitude of the tax administration 
is an important factor for the consent of citizens to the application of tax 
laws. This managerial legitimacy in tax matters means, on the one hand, 
that high quality services need to be rendered to the taxpayers, and on the 
other hand, that public expenditure stays in control by lowering the cost 
of tax collection. Thus the approach needs to focus more on prevention 
than repression. The objective is to promote and to reinforce tax compli-
ance; that is, the acceptance of taxes, by favouring spontaneous rather 
than compulsory payment of taxes (Bouvier, 2012, p. 25).
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3. Clarifying the Terminology
There are several terms that appear in the literature: enhanced relation-
ship, cooperative compliance, and horizontal monitoring.
The term “enhanced relationship” was coined by the Forum on Tax Admin-
istration (FTA) and used in the 2008 Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries. 
It was used to describe a conceptual framework for more cooperative rela-
tionships between taxpayers and revenue bodies. Basically, the study rec-
ommended that revenue bodies should look to establish a tax environment 
in which trust and cooperation can develop, so that enhanced relationships 
with large corporate taxpayers and tax advisors can be established.
The 2008 study considers that establishing and sustaining mutual trust 
between taxpayers and revenue bodies can be achieved through the fol-
lowing behaviour:
– in dealings with taxpayers, revenue bodies need to demonstrate under-
standing based on commercial awareness, impartiality, proportionality, 
openness through disclosure, and transparency and responsiveness; and
– in dealings with revenue bodies, taxpayers need to provide disclosure 
and transparency (OECD, 2008, p. 40). 
Since 2008 many revenue bodies have implemented compliance risk man-
agement strategies which are based on the pillars established in the study. 
The development of cooperative relationships with large businesses is now 
embedded in these strategies. 
However, the term “enhanced relationship” raised questions about the na-
ture of the approach and whether it can lead to connotations of inequality 
in tax treatment. Hence the OECD suggested that a new term be used; 
namely, “cooperative compliance”, which not only describes the process of 
cooperation but also its goal – compliance (OECD, 2013b, p. 13).
Finally, the term “horizontal monitoring” is used by the Netherlands to 
refer to the model they have designed. However, the term has started to 
be used by other countries as well, and can in a way be viewed as an inter-
changeable term. For example, the Slovenian tax administration also uses 
this term to refer to their programme.
4. Compliance Programmes
The Netherlands is a country that stands out as a pioneer in the field of tax 
compliance programmes. In 2005, the tax authorities conducted a survey 
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among large companies that revealed some criticism aimed at the way the tax 
administration conducted its tax audits. Two points were singled out, the first 
one being mistrust. In other words, the companies regarded the approach 
of the tax authorities as though all the company actions were driven by the 
motive to minimise their tax burden. The other objection was that the audit 
methodology was considered to be unpleasant and focused on financial years 
that were closed long ago. The problem with this was that gathering this infor-
mation was time-consuming and costly. Together with the changes that oc-
curred in the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), it became 
clear that the old vertical monitoring model was no longer appropriate and 
that there was a need to switch to a horizontal approach, which meant con-
cluding compliance agreements and making arrangements about the degree 
of efficiency and intensity of horizontal monitoring. Therefore, in 2006 and 
2007, the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration (NTCA) organised 
pilot projects in which a total of 40 companies took part. Experiences of both 
the NTCA and the companies were very encouraging and the advantages of 
the new approach were rapidly recognised (Poolen, 2010, p. 18).
France, on the other hand, began its programmes in 2012, and 11 com-
panies out of the 27 which applied were selected (MEF, 2013). Slovenia 
started its project in 2010 under the title of “Horizontal Monitoring”, as 
a consequence of establishing the strategic business plan of the Slovenian 
tax administration for the period 2010–2013 (TARS, 2010). As stated be-
fore, the Croatian tax administration introduced the legal framework for 
this kind of monitoring in May 2015. 
5. Benefits of Such an Approach
The idea behind the horizontal monitoring approach, as opposed to the 
vertical monitoring approach – that is, the old approach based on repres-
sion – is that it enhances compliance. Compliance is defined as citizens 
and businesses satisfying four basic tax obligations: to register for tax 
purposes, to file tax returns and do so on time, to correctly report tax 
liabilities, and to pay taxes on time (OECD, 2008). However, taxpayers 
can be divided into compliant taxpayers who fulfil their tax obligations 
and non-compliant taxpayers who are not willing to fulfil their tax obli-
gations. Some of those compliant taxpayers are compliant due to fear of 
repression, whilst others are “intrinsically” compliant; i.e., motivated by 
their own internal sense of the obligation to pay tax. The latter group of 
taxpayers may be described as “voluntary” (Gribnau, 2015).
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The main goal of the horizontal monitoring approach is to enhance precise-
ly the voluntary type of compliance. The way a tax administration conducts 
itself with the taxpayers can have a profound impact on the way taxpayers 
act in return. The tax administration’s compliance strategy may enhance 
compliance by taking into account – and acting accordingly – the causes of 
non-compliant behaviours of taxpayers, ranging from lack of knowledge to 
fraud. It can also enhance their voluntary compliance. 
Therefore, the tax administration can focus more on those taxpayers who 
are not compliant and make better use of their resources (human and fi-
nancial). This dual approach can be summarised in the phrase used by the 
Dutch tax administration: “Flexible when possible, strict where necessary”.
On the other hand, taxpayers profit from legal certainty. This is especially 
true for large taxpayers who operate on an international scale and face 
complex financial and fiscal structures. They also face constant amend-
ments to the legislation with which they should comply. Based on the 
results of horizontal monitoring processes so far, the advantages that the 
taxpayer perceives in the enhanced relationship are: 1) a reduction of the 
time-consuming components of tax compliance, 2) the updating and up-
grading of their knowledge, and 3) greater tax certainty (Čop et al., 2013).
However, not all taxpayers fulfil the criteria to take part in such a pro-
gramme.
6. Selection Criteria
The criteria used by the NTCA are the following. The first step is to con-
duct a compliance scan, whose goal is both to assess the organisation and 
to review the feasibility of horizontal monitoring. The compliance scan 
is conducted by carrying out interviews with a number of key officers in 
the company. Its intention is to yield an improved insight into the tax 
attitude of the organisation and the parties involved, and the fulfilment 
of the preconditions attached to the achievement of adequate tax control. 
The information about the organisation gathered in this way gives more 
depth to the client profile and is directly used in determining the form and 
intensity of the supervision and its prioritisation (Belastingdienst, 2013, 
p.17). During the meeting, the following issues need to be discussed: (1) 
strategic objectives – the focus is on the manner in which the organisa-
tion’s strategic objectives demonstrate its attention to compliance with 
the regulations, (2) internal control environment – the focus is on the 
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manner in which the organisation’s internal control devotes attention to tax 
matters, (3) information systems – the focus is on the manner in which the 
organisation devotes attention to information systems of relevance to tax, 
(4) tax function – the focus is on the manner in which the organisation has 
given shape to the performance of its tax function, and (5) external moni-
toring and advice – the central question is which role external supervisors 
and specialists play in the organisation’s tax control, as well as compliance, 
attitude, and behaviours of the company. Potential partners in these dis-
cussions include members of the executive board, the head of the tax de-
partment, controller, and compliance officer (Belastingdienst, 2013, p. 21).
The criteria employed by the French legislator are similar to those employed 
by the Dutch lawmaker. Thus the taxpayers that participated in the pro-
gramme were objectively examined, taking into account their tax situation, 
their financial situation, their domain of activities, and their size. From the 
27 companies that applied, 11 were selected, with profiles varying from 
small and medium-sized enterprises to very large companies, and coming 
from a range of sectors (industry, finance, and services). Attention was also 
paid to their geographical location, so that they were not all located in Par-
is. Therefore, the following companies were selected: some entities of the 
BPCE Group, Feel Europe Group, GRTgaz (GDF Suez Group), some 
companies of the General Electric Group, Dr. Pierre Ricaud of the Yves 
Rocher Group, Sicar, Sinequa, and Viessmann Limited) (MEF, 2013, p. 5).
In Slovenia, out of 721 large taxpayers in 2010, 18 responded and were 
included in the pilot project of horizontal monitoring. Agreements were 
signed between the Slovenian tax authorities and three groups of taxpayers: 
1) 13 finance and insurance companies, 2) 2 pharmaceutical companies, 
and (3) 3 other large companies (Šinkovec, 2012). The key criterion for the 
selection process was the result of the risk assessment procedure; in other 
words, the tax administration needed to make sure that the taxpayer would 
indeed fulfil the obligations undertaken in the concluded agreement.
According to Croatian law, special status can be attributed to taxpayers 
who satisfy the following criteria:
– they have received an auditor’s report without reservations over the 
last three years;
– they have established an internal control system;
– they agree to inform the tax administration of all their decisions that 
could have an impact on their tax situation;
– the members of their management board have not been convicted of 
a crime in the last three years;
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– the information that the tax administration possesses indicates that 
the taxpayer will respect the obligations that it has undertaken in 
order to get the special status. The following information will be tak-
en into consideration: compliance with deadlines for submitting tax 
forms, compliance with deadlines for paying tax, and the results of 
previous and current tax audits.
One can see that Croatia has a rather detailed list of requirements for the 
special status to be granted. We deem this to be a positive thing because 
the more objective criteria the legislation sets out, the lesser the chance 
that the status is granted on an arbitrary basis.
7. Principles and Objectives of the Procedure
When examining the procedures, it can be seen that they are all based 
on the following principles: trust, transparency, and mutual understand-
ing. These principles are also stated in Art. 2, point 3 of the Croatian 
Rulebook. The French agreement cites three other principles: availability, 
pragmatism, and consideration for technical and operational constraints 
(Art. 2 of Protocole de coopération en vue d’une revue contradictoire de la sit-
uation fiscale de l’entreprise appelée relation de confiance). The whole proce-
dure is entered into on a voluntary basis; it is the company that approach-
es the tax administration.
The objective of the procedure in France is to obtain an informal validation 
of the tax year within six months that follow the closing of the books. The 
procedure of validation can last from three up to nine months, depending 
on the size of the company and the complexity of the questions treated.
In Croatia, the objective of the procedure is not determined in such a pre-
cise manner. Art. 2 of the Rulebook simply states that the aim is to reduce 
tax risks managed by taxpayers and to enhance voluntary tax compliance 
of taxpayers. It seems that horizontal monitoring in Croatia can encom-
pass several tax years. The same applies to Slovenia and the Netherlands. 
The aim is to have a continuous monitoring system put into place.
8. Structure of the Procedure
The procedure can be divided into five consecutive steps: 1) initiation of 
the procedure for obtaining special status, 2) creating the taxpayer’s pro-
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file, 3) introductory interview with the taxpayer, 4) concluding the com-
pliance agreement, and 5) evaluation of the results. 
The initiation procedure is basically the beginning of the whole proce-
dure, where the taxpayer approaches the tax administration with a writ-
ten request to be granted the status. All the countries had set a limit on 
the number of taxpayers that could obtain the status, at least in the pilot 
project, in order to limit the number of applicants and ensure that the 
administration was not flooded by requests they could not handle. 
In the Croatian Rulebook, the company is required to submit a written 
statement including the following information:
1. a description of the activities, management, and control of the com-
pany; a short description of the business surroundings and the struc-
ture of suppliers and buyers; information on the ownership structure; 
the basic principles of the strategic plans; the way of measuring the 
company goals; and a succinct plan of managing human resources;
2. a description of internal control, audit results over the last three years, 
and a brief description of managing the main business risks;
3. a short list of the main tax risks and the instruments used to manage 
these;
4. experience of previous communication with the tax administration 
and its expectations regarding the special status they have applied 
for;
5. information on the contact person.
In addition to the application, the taxpayer also needs to provide a written 
statement that they will inform the tax administration of all business de-
cisions which could generate a certain tax risk, as well as provide credible 
documentation that the board members have not been sanctioned for a 
crime in the previous three years.
The next phase sees the creation of the taxpayer’s profile. This phase in-
cludes using information from tax administration databases, data from 
other supervisory authorities, publicly available data about the taxpayer, 
and the data submitted by the taxpayers themselves. This last part is of 
particular importance because the taxpayer undertakes the obligation to 
inform the tax administration about all potential tax risk activities in a 
comprehensive and timely manner. The taxpayer’s profile is used by the 
working group of the tax administration to define the critical segments of 
the taxpayer’s activities on which their attention should be focused (Ver-
bič et al., 2014, p. 69).
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Afterwards, equipped with the taxpayer’s profile, the tax administration 
will call the taxpayer to an introductory interview. The Croatian Rule-
book does not specify which issues need to be addressed during the initial 
interview. According to the Dutch tax administration, the introductory 
interview should serve to open a discussion in the following important ar-
eas: 1) the strategic objectives of the taxpayer, 2) the internal tax control 
framework, 3) the information system, 4) the tax functions, 5) external 
supervision, and 6) attitude and behaviour (supra). 
The Croatian tax administration needs to respond to the taxpayer within 
thirty days of receiving the written request. 
If in the previous steps the tax administration and the taxpayer have come 
to the conclusion that it would be justified, prudent, and useful to grant 
the special status to the taxpayer, they will proceed to the conclusion of 
an agreement. 
The Croatian Rulebook is rather detailed regarding the rights and obli-
gations of both parties (Art. 10). Accordingly, the taxpayer needs to pay 
taxes in a timely manner, taking into account all existing tax regulations. 
The taxpayer is also required to submit tax returns and reports as soon as 
possible; that is, straight after concluding the tax year. A system of inter-
nal control and an external audit procedure need to be established. The 
taxpayer undertakes the obligation to give the tax administration insight 
into all relevant facts and circumstances from which a certain tax risk can 
arise, as well as to give their legal opinions on tax questions and their con-
sequences. Finally, the taxpayer needs to give the tax administration all 
the data they require in a comprehensive and timely manner. 
The tax administration, on the other hand, needs to harmonise the man-
ner and intensity of monitoring the quality of internal and external audit 
procedures. It needs to give advice, guidance, and issue legal opinions 
when the taxpayer has a question about a current or future legal issue. 
This needs to be accompanied by detailed consultations with the taxpay-
er and discussions regarding the relevant tax issues, especially those on 
which the tax administration has a different stance. 
The tax administration needs to promote working in real time; in other 
words, it needs to address the taxpayer’s issues and demands in the short-
est time possible. 
The tax administration needs to resolve pending tax issues and determine 
further procedures regarding these issues. In case an issue arises that re-
quires a tax audit procedure, the tax administration will terminate the 
agreement. 
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The Croatian Rulebook provides for conditions in which the special status 
can be revoked (Art. 12). This is performed by terminating the agreement, 
and both parties are permitted to do that. However, before terminating 
the agreement, the party wishing to perform the termination needs to 
provide the other party with an explanation in the form of a written state-
ment. Moreover, termination of the agreement is not possible without 
giving an explanation if the other party requests one. There seems to be 
some confusion regarding whether the explanation needs to be in written 
or oral form. Namely, Art. 12, point 2 of the Rulebook states that each 
party to the contract can cancel it, providing a written explanation is given 
of the reasons for the cancellation. On the other hand, points 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 mention an oral explanation that needs to be requested in writing 
within thirty days of the receipt of the notification that the agreement 
has been terminated. The other party has fifteen days to provide the ex-
planation. If neither of the parties request an oral explanation, then the 
agreement will be terminated within thirty days of receiving the notifica-
tion of termination. The tax administration may terminate the agreement 
unilaterally and with immediate effect in case of any indication that an 
audit procedure needs to be conducted. In that case, the tax administra-
tion needs to inform the taxpayer or its counsellor of the termination of 
the contract within eight days of said termination.
All in all, some criticisms may be levelled at the way termination of the 
agreement is regulated in the Croatian Rulebook. There seem to be three 
ways that an agreement can be cancelled: by written notification accom-
panied by a written explanation of the reasons; secondly, by written noti-
fication unaccompanied by an explanation (which can then be requested 
by the other party); and lastly, a unilateral way of cancelling the agree-
ment that is reserved for the tax administration. 
It remains unclear why there are two possible ways of cancelling the agree-
ment, depending on whether the explanation is given in writing or orally. 
This might be a nomotechnical error. 
In any case, the termination of the agreement can bring about some 
difficulties. First, engaging voluntarily in the horizontal monitoring pro-
gramme requires a significant investment on part of the taxpayer. A tax-
payer who opts out of a contract therefore has to face the loss of that 
investment. Secondly, taxpayers who intend to terminate the contract 
may fear unfair treatment by the tax administration and may be afraid 
of increasing distrust and, as a result, the tax administration increasing 
its vertical monitoring. Thirdly, they may fear that terminating a contract 
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may harm their reputation, for these contracts can sometimes be seen as 
a warranty of quality by their stakeholders.
In the French law the obligations are fundamentally the same (Art. 8 of 
the Protocole de coopération en vue d’une revue contradictoire de la situation 
fiscale de l’entreprise appelée relation de confiance). However, there seem to 
be some differences in guarantees given to the taxpayer. For instance, the 
protocol explicitly states that the company can file a corrected tax return 
for all tax periods for which the statute of limitations has not expired, 
without any penalties or interest on late payment. 
Furthermore, the French law explicitly says that all positions that the 
French tax administration expressly assumes regarding the taxpayer can 
be used against the tax administration in future, not only by the taxpayer, 
but also by members of the same group. On the other hand, the Croatian 
taxpayer does not have such a guarantee. 
Another guarantee that is present in Art. 9 of the French protocol, but 
is missing in the Croatian Rulebook, is the one according to which the 
tax administration cannot use the information presented during the hori-
zontal monitoring procedure in any other procedures or for any other 
purpose, besides that determined by the agreement (Art. 9 of the Proto-
cole de coopération en vue d’une revue contradictoire de la situation fiscale de 
l’entreprise appelée relation de confiance). The Croatian General Tax Act 
does indeed provide for tax secrecy in its Article 8, but this provision only 
prevents the tax administration from disclosing the information to third 
persons who are not employees of the tax administration or who do not 
have a particular legal interest in possessing that information. 
The question that remains unanswered is whether it is possible to use the 
information gathered in the horizontal monitoring procedure against the 
taxpayer in another procedure that was not covered by the agreement. 
On the one hand, this would oppose the principle of trust between the 
taxpayer and the tax administration, and render the taxpayers unwilling 
to engage in such a procedure. 
On the other hand, if the taxpayer has disclosed information to the tax 
administration which the taxpayer then later on chooses to withhold from 
tax administration, one cannot qualify this as fair behaviour on the part of 
the taxpayer either. For the sake of clarity, it is this author’s opinion that 
this matter should be expressly settled by including an explicit provision 
in the Rulebook.
The French law also provides for an interesting way to resolve disagree-
ments. At the end of the procedure, the administration needs to produce a 
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written opinion regarding the issues that were discussed during the moni-
toring procedure. This can then be used by the company in any further 
procedures which the tax administration undertakes against the company. 
However, it is conceivable for the tax administration and the company to 
be unable to reach an agreement during the horizontal monitoring proce-
dure. In case the company opposes the views of the tax administration, it 
can request a second review provided by the Service juridique de la fiscalité. 
This service will engage in a re-examination of the issue. The only conse-
quence is interest charged for late payment. 
Following this line of thought, one can ask whether the possibility of a 
judicial review of the tax administration’s decision should be allowed, 
regarding the administration’s choice to conclude an agreement or not, 
during the execution of the agreement, or concerning the termination of 
the contract. This seems to be a point that raises some questions. Given 
the trust-based nature of the whole relationship, one can argue that a 
judicial review of the process goes against the whole idea of a relationship 
founded on cooperation. Perhaps a mediation process would be more in 
line with the basic principles of the procedure. However, mediation in 
Croatian tax law is still non-existent, even though some scholars are rec-
ommending its implementation (Rogić-Lugarić & Čičin-Šain, 2014). 
9. Results
A survey conducted by one of the big four audit companies demonstrates 
that although participation in horizontal monitoring programmes in the 
Netherlands remains limited, the overall results are satisfactory. For in-
stance, from a pool of 721 corporate tax executives, only 13% were in-
volved in a horizontal-type monitoring programme. However, 80% of 
those involved said their overall experience had been positive. The major 
benefits pointed out by the respondents were: 1) reaching certainty on 
tax issues sooner (38%), 2) a more efficient use of resources (30%), and 
3) limiting the focus of the audit to significant/material processes (23%) 
(Petruzzi & Spies, 2014, p. 650).
In France, the pilot project has not yet made its results public, although 
publication was expected in September 2015. 
In Slovenia, the horizontal monitoring process has proven to be success-
ful. As stated previously, out of 721 large corporate taxpayers in Slovenia, 
18 were included in the horizontal monitoring process; namely, 13 from 
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the finance and insurance industry, 2 from the pharmaceutical industry, 
and 3 from the category of “others”. Based on experience and evidence 
to date, taxpayers are showing a greater willingness to cooperate with the 
Slovenian tax administration and disclose the tax risks of their operations 
(Verbič et al., 2014, p. 75).
It is still far too soon to assess the success of the programme in Croatia. 
The call to corporations was issued only recently and to this date no agree-
ments have been signed. It will be interesting to see which companies will 
choose to participate in the pilot programme. Even if it is not be possible 
to discover the exact names of the taxpayers taking part in the procedure 
due to tax secrecy, their profile, i.e., their sector of activity can provide 
us with interesting information (retailers, finance companies, or others).
10. Conclusion
Even though it is too early to determine whether the horizontal moni-
toring procedure in Croatia is efficient or not, because it has only been 
recently introduced and there are no data on the results of the procedure, 
it is safe to say that the Croatian legislation, based on the Dutch model, is 
sufficiently elaborate and contemporary in order to provide a good start-
ing point for successful horizontal monitoring procedures to take place. 
The only point that could potentially present a problem is the capacity of 
the Croatian tax administration to conduct these procedures. Indeed, the 
aim of these procedures is to provide for a preventive monitoring system 
and to prevent later tax audits. Therefore, the tax administration needs to 
take special care when assessing the information provided by the taxpayer 
because subsequent tax audits are, in principle, not allowed. One can only 
imagine the extent of caution that needs to go into the evaluation of the 
data provided. This could present a challenge, bearing in mind the scarcity 
of human resources at the disposal of the Croatian tax administration, 
especially those highly trained in these delicate issues. 
If the Croatian taxpayer does not have the impression that the tax admin-
istration’s obligations or capacities can match the degree of transparency 
that is required of the taxpayer, they might be reluctant to engage in such 
a procedure. 
Another point that needs to be addressed is the utilisation of the informa-
tion disclosed by the taxpayer in case the procedure comes to an abrupt 
end. This can also make the taxpayers unwilling to engage in the procedure. 
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Bearing all this in mind, the introduction of a horizontal monitoring pro-
cedure in Croatian law represents a step forward towards the moderni-
sation of the tax administration. It might enable the tax administration 
to lower its tax audit costs (very high for both the tax administration and 
the taxpayer), and it could facilitate foreign investments due to a more 
favourable tax climate.
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A NEW APPROACH OF THE CROATIAN TAX ADMINISTRATION 
TOWARDS TAXPAYERS BASED ON COOPERATION INSTEAD OF 
REPRESSION: A TRUE CHANGE IN ATTITUDE
Summary
In this article the shift in the tax administration’s approach towards taxpayers, 
which is more based on co-operation than repression, is being analysed. This 
new approach, advocated by the Organization for Economic and Cooperation 
Development (OECD), is present in a growing number of countries and serves as 
an additional tool for ensuring timely tax collection. Croatia recently adopted 
legislation regarding co-operative compliance, which makes the topic a highly 
interesting one especially knowing that there is a lack a research concerning this 
topic in Croatia. By performing a comparative analysis with selected countries 
(the Netherlands, France and Slovenia), the following issues are discussed: the 
reasons for such a change in attitude, the way terminology is used by the leading 
organisations in the field, the way the change in attitude manifests through com-
pliance programmes, what are the selection criteria for participating in the pro-
grammes, the main principles and objectives of the procedure, the way the pro-
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cedure is structured, and the results of the co-operative compliance programmes. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are presented.
Keywords: enhanced relationship, co-operative compliance, tax evasion and 
avoidance, Croatian tax administration
NOVI PRISTUP HRVATSKE POREZNE UPRAVE ODNOSIMA S 
POREZNIM OBVEZNICIMA NA TEMELJU SURADNJE UMJESTO 
REPRESIJE – STVARNA PROMJENA STAVA
Sažetak
Posljednjih godina dolazi do promjene u odnosu poreznih službi prema pore-
znim obveznicima koji su više zasnovani na načelima suradnje nego represije. 
Tu promjenu koju posebice zagovara Organizacija za ekonomsku suradnju i ra-
zvoj (OECD) uvodi sve veći broj država kao komplementarnu metodu za osigu-
ranje pravovremene i potpune naplate poreznih dugovanja. Tako je i Hrvatska 
nedavno uvela zakonsku osnovu te pravilnik koji omogućava dodjelu posebnog 
statusa poreznom obvezniku u svrhu promicanja dobrovoljnog ispunjenja pore-
znih obveza. S obzirom na to da su ti propisi stupili na snagu nedavno, malo 
je istraživanja provedeno na tu temu, što ju čini posebno zanimljivom. U ovom 
se radu stanje u Hrvatskoj uspoređuje sa stanjem u Nizozemskoj, Francuskoj 
i Sloveniji. Prikazuju se razlozi za takvu promjenu u pristupu, obrađuje se 
terminologija znanstvene literature radi pojašnjenja pojmova, prikazuju se pro-
grami zasnovani na novom pristupu odnosu s poreznim obveznicima te kriteriji 
za odabir sudionika u tim programima, glavna načela te svrha programa, faze 
unutar procedure te najzad rezultati programa. Naposljetku, ocjenjuje se dosa-
dašnje stanje hrvatske legislative u ovom području.
Ključne riječi: poboljšani odnos, suradnja u provedbi poreznih propisa, neza-
konito i zakonito izbjegavanje porezne obveze, hrvatska porezna služba
